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I. INTRODUCTION
The recognized purposes of the criminal law are the prevention
and punishment of anti-social conduct.1 Those purposes are most
often accomplished through the mechanisms of deterrence, education,
rehabilitation and retribution.2 Thus, for example, by implementing
criminal sanctions in the environmental arena, "society endeavors to
modify individual and institutional behavior to achieve high levels of
compliance with environmental laws."3
Ordinarily, one is not guilty of a crime unless one has scienter-the
criminal intent to commit the crime.4 Writing for the Morissette
* B.A., Wellesley College 1985; J.D., Harvard Law School 1988. The author was
involved in the oil spill litigation referenced in this case. She is currently a senior
trial attorney with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and an ad-
junct professor at South Texas College of Law.
1. See JEROME HALi, GENERAL PRiNCLES OF CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 1960).
2. Susan L. Smith, Shields for the King's Men: Official Immunity and Other Obsta-
cles to Effective Prosecution of Federal Officials for Environmental Crimes, 16
Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1, 5 n.13 (1991).
3. Id.
4. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
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Court, Justice Jackson noted that the principle of scienter is deeply
rooted in American legal philosophy:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by
intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent
in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a conse-
quent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and
evil. A relation between some mental element and punishment for a harmful
act is almost as instinctive as the child's familiar exculpatory "But I didn't
mean to," and has afforded the rational basis for a tardy and unfinished substi-
tution of deterrence and reformation in place of retaliation and vengeance as
the motivation for public prosecution.
5
Because modern society believes man has the mental capacity to
choose between good and evil, society generally punishes an offender
only when he has chosen to do evil, and not when there is an absence
of mental intent to cause harm.6 Our criminal justice system thus is
predicated upon the principle of individual free will.7
Nevertheless, the legislature is empowered to declare an act crimi-
nal regardless of the intent or knowledge of the actor.8 Thus, it is not
unconstitutional to deem a certain act a crime even if the act commit-
ted was an innocent mistake.9 The legislature has not hesitated to
utilize its power to create offenses in which criminal intent is not an
element of the crime, particularly in the area of public welfare of-
fenses.1 0 Justice Jackson attributes this phenomenon in the Moris-
sette case to the rise of the industrial revolution. He explains that the
industrial revolution brought with it powerful and complex machin-
ery and energy sources inherently dangerous to the public in general
and workers in particular."1 Those new resources required pervasive
regulations to combat the ever-increasing dangers to public health,
safety and welfare engendered by many of the burgeoning indus-
tries.12 Believing that criminal sanctions were the most powerful
form of regulation, lawmakers implemented not only strict civil liabil-
ity, but strict criminal liability as well.1 3
5. 1d at 250-51 (footnote omitted).
6. Id
7. Id-
8. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922).
9. Id.
10. See supra note 4.
11. Id at 253-54.
12. I&
13. In Morissette, the Court explicitly noted:
The industrial revolution multiplied the number of workmen exposed to
injury from increasingly powerful and complex mechanisms, driven by
freshly discovered sources of energy, requiring higher precautions by
employers. Traffic of velocities, volumes and varieties unheard of came
to subject the wayfarer to intolerable casualty risks if owners and drivers
were not to observe new cares and uniformities of conduct. Congestion
of cities and crowding of quarters called for health and welfare regula-
tions undreamed of in simpler times. Wide distribution of goods became
1034 [Vol. 71:1033
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The earliest examples of criminal penalties imposed in cases where
scienter was not an element of the crime date back to the mid-nine-
teenth century.14 The first is the conviction of a tavernkeeper who
sold liquor to a habitual drunkard without knowing that the buyer
was intoxicated.'5 Then came a set of rulings holding that a defendant
could be convicted of selling adulterated milk in violation of a Massa-
chusetts statute, even if the defendant did not know that the milk was
tainted.16 Contemporary public welfare offenses that lack a criminal
intent requirement include the unintentional discharges of hazardous
waste, such as crude 01l.17
When applied to accidents occurring in the environmental arena,
the behavioral effectiveness of criminal law mechanisms is dubious.
Existing federal regulation has criminalized environmental accidents
without regard to the behavioral intent of the actor.' 8 Such legislation
is troubling not only in light of the theoretical moorings of the crimi-
nal law, but also due to its wastefulness and impracticality.
The federal statutory scheme that governs environmental acci-
dents provides for-in addition to criminal sanctions-extensive civil
remedies in the form of civil and administrative penalties and provi-
sions for payment of cleanup, restoration, and damages costs by the
perpetrator of the accident.19 Those statutory provisions are supple-
mented by common law and state remedies available to all of those
an instrument of wide distribution of harm when those who dispersed
food, drink, drugs, and even securities, did not comply with reasonable
standards of quality, integrity, disclosure and care. Such dangers have
engendered increasingly numerous and detailed regulations which
heighten the duties of those in control of particular industries, trades,
properties or activities that affect public health, safety or welfare.
While many of these duties are sanctioned by a more strict civil liabil-
ity, lawmakers, whether wisely or not, have sought to make such regula-
tions more effective by invoking criminal sanctions to be applied by the
familiar technique of criminal prosecutions and convictions.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
14. Id. at 256.
15. Barnes v. State, 19 Conn. 398 (1849).
16. Commonwealth v. Farren, 9 Allen 489 (1864); Commonwealth v. Nichols, 10 Al-
len 199 (1865); Commonwealth v. Waite, 11 Allen 264 (1865).
17. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. II 1990); (criminal provi-
sions at §§ 1311(a) and 1321(b)); Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899
("Refuse Act"), 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-67 (1988 & Supp. H 1990)(criminal provisions at
§ 441); Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 701-18 (1988 & Supp. H
1990)(criminal provisions at § 703; penalties at § 707).
18. See Alan Saltzman, Strict Criminal Liability and the United States Constitution:
Substantive Criminal Law Due Process, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1571 (1978) for a vigor-
ous challenge to the constitutionality of strict criminal liability. The constitu-
tional challenge is rooted in the theories that strict criminal liability violates the
Eighth Amendment bar against cruel and unusual punishment and that it denies
substantive due process in that it contravenes the presumption of innocence.
19. See, e.g., Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-61 (Supp. II 1990); Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
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injured by accidental oil spills.20 In light of the extensive remedial
scheme available in cases of oil spill accidents and for a variety of
other policy reasons, such criminalization is inappropriate and waste-
ful. The civil and administrative remedies providing for cleanup and
restoration are certainly sufficient and-in terms of encouraging envi-
ronmental compliance-perhaps even more effective than criminal
sanctions.
II. CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN UNITED STATES V. EXXON
CORPORATION AND EXXON SHIPPING COMPANY:21
WHAT ABOUT CRIMINAL INTENT?
A case study of the Exxon Valdez prosecution demonstrates the
inappropriateness of criminal prosecution for accidental oil spills. The
Exxon defendants were subjected to multiple charges without any ex-
isting evidence of intent to pollute.22 This is an obvious challenge to
the traditional principles of criminal law.23
The indictment against Exxon Corporation and Exxon Shipping
Company included charges under three statutes that lacked tradi-
tional criminal intent provisions: The Clean Water Act,24 the Refuse
Act,25 and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.26 The Clean Water Act al-
lows conviction for negligent behavior,27 and the other two statutes
impose strict criminal liability.28
Under the Clean Water Act, anyone who "negligently" discharges
pollutants, including crude oil, into navigable waters, is subject to
criminal penalties.29 The culpability element is, thus, a very low
one.3 0 A negligent violator of the Clean Water Act is punishable by a
20. See, e.g. 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a)(1)(Supp. I1 1990) and 33 U.S.C. § 1321(o)(1988 & Supp.
1990)(stating that the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and the Clean Water Act do not
preempt state remedies for oil discharges); International Paper Co. v. Ouelette,
479 U.S. 481 (1987)(holding that the Clean Water Act does not preempt common
law claims unless they conflict with the Clean Water Act).
21. United States of America v. Exxon Corp., No. A90-015 CR (D. Ala. filed Feb. 27,
1990).
22. Eva M. Fromm, Commanding Respect Criminal Sanctions for Environmental
Crimes, 21 ST. MARY's L.J. 821, 824 (1990).
23. While environmental statutes with a criminal intent requirement do exist, the
purpose of this Article is limited to a review and structured criticism of the use of
criminal law where the actor lacked scienter.
24. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
25. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-67 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
26. 16 U.S.C. §§ 701-18 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
27. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(1988 & Supp. II 1990).
28. 16 U.S.C. § 707(a)(1988) and 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1988).
29. See supra note 28.
30. Under the Model Penal Code, § 2.02(2)(d)(Official Draft 1985) an offense is com-
mitted negligently if the defendant's conduct constitutes a "gross deviation from
the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's
situation."
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fine of not less than $2500 nor more than $25,000 per day of violation,
or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both.31 The
punishment for repeat violators is more severe.32
The Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899,33 commonly
known as the "Refuse Act," makes it unlawful "to throw, discharge, or
deposit... any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever...
into any navigable waters of the United States."34 Section 16 of the
Refuse Act provides for a misdemeanor penalty of up to one year im-
prisonment and/or a fine of up to $2500 for discharge of any refuse
matter into the navigable waters of the United States.35 The deposit
of refuse in navigable waters has been held to be a strict liability
crime.36
The Migratory Bird Treaty Act37 makes it unlawful to pursue,
hunt, take, capture or kill, or to attempt to pursue, hunt, take, capture
or kill any migratory bird or any part, nest, or egg of any migratory
bird named in certain international conventions unless permitted to
do so by the regulations implementing the Act.38 Any person, associa-
tion, partnership, or corporation that violates the Act or the interna-
tional conventions to which it refers is subject to a misdemeanor
conviction and a fine not exceeding $500 and/or not more than six
months imprisonment.3 9 A violator can only be penalized for each act
or incident constituting a violation, rather than for each dead bird re-
sulting from such an act or incident.40
The majority of circuit courts that have ruled on the issue have
concluded that the misdemeanor provision of the Migratory Bird
31. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(1988 & Supp. IE 1990).
32. I
33. See suprm note 26.
34. 33 U.S.C § 407 (1988).
35. The Refuse Act states:
Every person and every corporation that shall violate, or that shall
knowingly aid, abet, authorize, or instigate a violation of the provisions
of ... this title shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $2,500 nor less than
$500, or by imprisonment (in the case of a natural person) for not less
than thirty days nor more than one year, or by both such fine and impris-
onment ....
33 U.S.C § 411 (1988).
36. U.S. v. Ashland Oil Inc., 705 F. Supp. 270, 276 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
37. See supmr note 27.
38. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (Supp. II 1990).
39. 16 U.S.C. § 707(a)(1988).
40. United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 531 (E.D. Cal. 1978)("[I]f
Congress does not fix the punishment for a federal offense clearly and without
ambiguity, doubt will be resolved against turning a single transaction into multi-
ple offenses." (quoting Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 84 (1955))). The Ninth
Circuit affirmed and adopted this part of the decision as its own in United States
v. Corbin Farm Serv., 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978).
1992] 1037
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1033
Treaty Act is a regulatory measure designed to protect the public wel-
fare, thus precluding any basis for judicial inference that intent need
be shown.41 In United States v. Catlett,42 for example, the Sixth Cir-
cuit upheld the convictions of a number of dove hunters who, in viola-
tion of the Act, were found unintentionally hunting in a baited field.
The hunters were convicted despite an absence of evidence "tending to
show that any of the defendants either baited the field, or knew that it
was baited at any time."43 The Court explained:
The law is, unhappily for defendants, established that scienter is not required
for a conviction. We concede that it is a harsh rule and trust that prosecution
will take place in the exercise of sound discretion only. It is for Congress and
the Secretary of the Interior to establish and change the policies here
involved.44
The application of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act to oil spill cases
is likely a far reaching interpretation of the statute, which was not
intended by Congress. The legislative history of the 1960 amendment
to the Act speaks of the amendment as authorizing "more severe pen-
alties for... market hunters. . . ." 45 The language clearly suggests
that the statute was intended to punish and deter hunters who target
birds-not those who suffer accidents that involve the remote conse-
41. See United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425 (3d Cir. 1986)(dealer of migratory bird
parts convicted for violation of Migratory Bird Treaty Act without proof of scien-
ter), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1019 (1987); United States v. Catlett, 747 F.2d 1102 (6th
Cir. 1984)(dove hunters convicted for unintentionally hunting in a baited field in
violation of the Act without proof of criminal intent), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1074
(1985); United States v. Brandt, 717 F.2d 955 (6th Cir. 1983)(defendants convicted
of violating regulations promulgated under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, which
prohibited the taking of migratory birds by aid of baiting, and scienter was deter-
mined not to be an element of the crime); United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d
902 (2d Cir. 1978)(conviction without proof of criminal intent was based on the
death of water fowl resulting from the improper pre-treatment of toxic residue
which was discharged into a wastewater pond frequented by water fowl); United
States v. Green, 571 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1977) (defendant convicted of violating regula-
tion prohibiting the taking of mourning doves "on or over any baited area" even
though he did not know the field over which he hunted was baited); United States
v. Ireland, 493 F.2d 1208 (4th Cir. 1973)(defendant convicted for aiding and abet-
ting the taking of migratory birds with the aid of bait on and over a baited area
without proof that defendant knew the area was baited); United States v. Jarman,
491 F.2d 764 (4th Cir. 1974) (defendants convicted of hunting migratory birds over
a baited area in violation of Migratory Bird Treaty Act without proof of scienter);
Rogers v. United States, 367 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1966)(defendant convicted of un-
lawful sale or possession of wild ducks and geese, and proof of guilty knowledge
or intent to commit a violation was held to be unnecessary in a prosecution under
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act), cert denied, 386 U.S. 943 (1967).
42. 747 F.2d 1102 (6th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1074 (1985).
43. Id at 1103-04.
44. Id. at 1105 (footnote omitted).
45. S. Rep. No. 1779, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1960), reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3459.
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quence of bird deaths.46
In the plea agreement filed on September 30, 1991, Exxon Shipping
Company pled guilty to three misdemeanor charges under the Clean
Water Act, the Refuse Act, and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.47 Ex-
xon Corporation pled guilty to one misdemeanor under the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act.48 All charges arose from the accidental discharge of
oil in Prince Williams Sound on March 24, 1989.49 It was undisputed
that Exxon Corporation and Exxon Shipping Company had no crimi-
nal intention in conjunction with the accident.50
Criminal prosecutions of environmental accidents serve neither
the purpose of deterrence nor the purpose of removing dangerous ele-
ments from society. Severe deterrence already is built into the exten-
sive civil regulatory scheme that governs environmental abuses.
Moreover, since the perpetrators of major environmental accidents
generally are companies rather than individuals, the sanction unique
to the criminal justice system-namely imprisonment-is rarely, if
ever, imposed. Rather, the violator is punished via criminal fines that
are often imposed alongside harsh civil penalties. Criminal actions
thus frequently invite expensive and duplicative litigation costs be-
cause defendants are most often subject to both criminal and civil law
actions. Such duplication generates enormous costs between the par-
ties without necessarily enhancing environmental protection.
46. The application of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act to oil spill accidents was in fact
unprecedented before the Exxon Valdez oil spill. All of the prior cases which
have construed the Migratory Bird Treaty Act to impose strict criminal liability
have done so only where a defendant intentionally engaged in conduct designed
to kill migratory birds or to profit from their sale, albeit supposedly under the
regulatory exceptions to the statute, or has released toxic substances in areas
where it knew or should have known that they could pose a significant threat to
migratory birds. Hence, in all these cases, there was some intentional act on the
part of the defendant. No prior case has convicted a defendant for purely acci-
dental behavior, such as the accidental discharge of oil. See supra note 41 for
examples of prior cases in which defendants were convicted without proof of sci-
enter for violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.
47. Plea agreement at 2, United States of America v. Exxon Corp., No. A90-015 CR
(D. Ala. filed Sept. 30, 1991).
48. I&
49. Id. at 2-3.
50. The plea agreement makes no mention of the Exxon defendants' acting with any
knowledge, willfulness, or intent.
1992] 1039
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III. CRIMINAL PENALTIES IN CASES OF OIL SPILL
ACCIDENTS ARE SUPERFLUOUS IN LIGHT OF THE
CIVIL LAW REGULATIONS AND
REMEDIES THAT GUARD
AGAINST ENVIRONMENTAL ABUSES
The Exxon Valdez case 51 supports the argument that civil reme-
dies, rather than criminal prosecutions, best protect society from acci-
dental oil spills. In addition to being criminally prosecuted, Exxon has
been sued under a myriad of civil law provisions. 52 The regulatory
body of environmental law provides a pervasive remedial scheme for
oil spill accidents. The scheme includes common law remedies, state
law remedies, and several federal statutes that provide for civil penal-
ties, administrative penalties, and the payment of cleanup costs and
environmental restoration costs.5 3 A review of that civil remedy
scheme is now warranted.
Under federal maritime law, a vessel owner is liable in the case of
unintentional torts for all direct losses sustained by those who suffer
personal injury or who have a proprietary interest in property physi-
cally damaged by the negligence of the defendant.54 The law provides,
however, that there can be no recovery in tort for downstream finan-
cial losses that are not incident to personal injury or property dam-
age.55 Under the common law, therefore, plaintiffs cannot recover for
monetary losses that occur as a collateral consequence of maritime
torts, such as lost economic opportunity.56
The federal statutory scheme pertaining to remedies for accidental
discharge of oil is also extensive. In March 1989, at the time of the
Exxon Valdez oil spill, the Clean Water Act governed most cases of oil
spill cleanup and liability.57 In light of the Valdez spill, Congress de-
termined that the Clean Water Act set inappropriately low limits of
liability for vessel owners and operators.58 Accordingly, it enacted the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990,59 which enhances the remedial scheme al-
51. See supra note 21.
52. See, e.g., Alaska v. Exxon Corp., No. A91-083 CIV (Consolidated Case No. A89-095
Civil)(D. Alaska filed Mar. 15, 1991), in which the State of Alaska sued the Exxon
defendants under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1988), and Sea Hawk
Seafoods, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., No. A89-095 CIV. (D. Ala. filed Mar. 30, 1989), in
which the defendants were sued under several admiralty theories including tres-
pass and public nuisance and under several Alaska statutes including ALASKA
STAT. § 46.03.822 (1991) and ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.230 (1991).
53. See supra notes 19 and 20.
54. Cf. Robins Drydock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
55. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
56. Id.
57. 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1988)(amended Supp. II 1990).
58. S. Rep. No. 94, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722,
724.
59. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (Supp. II 1990).
1040 [Vol. 71:1033
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ready in place under the Clean Water Act. The Act relies on Section
1321 of the Clean Water Act for providing the basic law for cleanup
authority, penalties for spills and a strict liability standard.60
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 caps liability at $1200 per gross ton
for vessels weighing more than 3 million gross tons or $10 million,
whichever is greater, for tankers carrying oil in bulk or commercial
quantities as cargo.6 1 That limitation is far higher than the liability lid
of the Clean Water Act, which was set at $150 per gross ton of the
vessel or $250,000, whichever was greater.6 2 The responsible party is
liable up to the limitation for all removal costs incurred by the United
States, a state, or an Indian tribe.63 In addition, the Act permits the
federal or state government's recovery of costs incurred in the restora-
tion of natural resources damaged as a result of an oil spill.64 Under
the legislation, owners and operators are likewise liable for: economic
damages including injury to real or personal property; impairment of
earning capacity resulting from injury to real or personal property;
and any direct or indirect loss of tax, royalty, rental, or net profit
shares revenue by the United States, a state, or political subdivision
for not more than one year.65
The limitation on liability is removed if the discharge was proxi-
mately caused by "gross negligence or willful misconduct" or the "vio-
lation of an applicable Federal safety, construction, or operating
regulation" by the responsible party.6 6 Defenses to liability are lim-
ited to an act of God, an act of war, or an act or omission of a third
party.67
The Act also establishes an Oil Spill Compensation Fund to pay for
removal and damage costs from an oil spill. The limit is $1 billion per
incident.68 The compensation fund replaces several other funds, in-
cluding the $100 million fund that was available under the Trans-
Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act69 for discharges-such as the
Valdez spill-that occurred before August 18, 1990, and involved oil
transported through the Trans-Alaska Pipeline.70
The fund is available to provide a source of compensation for
claims that are not settled by the discharger due to the liability limit
60. S. Rep. No. 94, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722,
732-33.
61. 33 U.S.C. § 2704 (Supp. II 1990).
62. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1)(1988).
63. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1)(Supp. II 1990).
64. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(A)(Supp. II 1990).
65. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) & (b)(Supp. H 1990).
66. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1)(Supp. J1 1990).
67. 33 U.S.C. § 2703 (Supp. II 1990).
68. 26 U.S.C. § 9509(c)(2)(A)(Supp. IE 1990).
69. 43 U.S.C. § 1651-55 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
70. 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(3) & (5)(1988 & Supp. II 1990).
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or a defense.71 The fund also is designed to provide a source of money
immediately available for cleanup activities or damage compensation
if the spiller does not act promptly.72 If used for that purpose, the
fund would be subrogated to all rights against the spiller for all ex-
penditures up to the extent of the discharger's liability.73 In addition,
the fund provides compensation for cases in which the spiller cannot
be identified or located or is judgment proof.74
The Oil Pollution Act also amends the Clean Water Act by increas-
ing the amount of civil penalties that can be imposed upon a spiller.
Civil penalties of up to $25,000 may be assessed for Class I violations
and up to $125,000 may be assessed for Class II violations.75 Civil ad-
ministrative penalties of an equal amount are also provided for by the
Clean Water Act.76 The statute, however, expressly states that civil
and administrative penalties may not both be assessed under the
Clean Water Act for the same violation.77
The Oil Pollution Act and the Clean Water Act do not preempt
many remedies under state law.78 The Oil Pollution Act explicitly
71. 33 U.S.C. § 2712(a)(Supp. II 1990). See also supra note 58 for legislative history.
72. 33 U.S.C. § 2712(d)(Supp. II 1990).
73. 33 U.S.C. § 2712(f)(Supp. II 1990).
74. 33 U.S.C. § 2712(Supp. II 1990).
75. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6)(B)(1988 & Supp. II 1990).
76. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(2)(1988).
77. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6)(E)(1988 & Supp. II 1990).
78. It should be noted, however, that state law remedies may be limited by federal
law in some instances. In Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917), the
Court struck down a New York comprehensive workman's compensation statute
that barred ships from loading or discharging cargo on New York docks without
complying with the statute's provisions on the ground that the state law signifi-
cantly impeded freedom of navigation between the states and foreign countries.
The Court stated: "[No such legislation is valid if it contravenes the essential
purpose expressed by an act of Congress or works material prejudice to the char-
acteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes with the proper har-
mony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations." I&
at 216. State common law, like state statutes, may also have to yield to contrary
maritime principles. In Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953), the
Court refused to apply a Pennsylvania common law rule under which a plaintiff's
contributory negligence wholly barred an injured person from recovery for an
injury suffered on navigable waters. The Court reasoned that the Pennsylvania
rule contravened modern admiralty principles and held that "[w]hile states may
sometimes supplement federal maritime policies, a state may not deprive a per-
son of any substantial admiralty rights as defined in controlling acts of Congress
or by interpretative decisions of this Court." I- at 409-10 (footnote omitted).
Similarly, in Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207 (1986) the Court
stated that "the extent to which state law may be used to remedy maritime inju-
ries is constrained by a so-called 'reverse-Erie' doctrine which requires that the
substantive remedies afforded by the States conform to governing federal mari-
time standards." I& at 223. In International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481
(1987), the Court applied this principle specifically to the Clean Water Act and
stated that the statute allows for state common law claims only to the extent that
1042
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states that it does not preempt any state from imposing additional lia-
bility with respect to the discharge of oil within the state or with re-
spect to its removal.7 9 The Clean Water Act contains an almost
identical provision.8 0
In Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc.,8 1 the Supreme
Court upheld a Florida oil spill cleanup law providing for the state's
recovery of cleanup costs and imposing liability without fault for any
oil spill damages incurred by the state or private persons.8 2 The Court
explicitly stated that the Clean Water Act "does not preclude, but in
fact allows, state regulation" over oil spill cleanup.8 3 In Askew, the
Court further stressed that the states were free to impose liability for
damages suffered by the states and their private citizens above and
beyond the liability for cleanup costs imposed by the Clean Water
Act.84
It has likewise been held that the Clean Water Act does not elimi-
nate the state's right to punish dischargers through the imposition of
statutory civil penalties.85 In Complaint of Allied Towing Corp.,8 6 the
court ruled that "nothing in the FWPCA [Clean Water Act] precludes
the states from imposing civil penalties upon vessel owners or opera-
tors who violate state statutes by discharging oil illegally."8 7
The Supreme Court has further held that the Clean Water Act
they do not obstruct the full implementation of the Clean Water Act. The Court
stated that a state law is invalid whenever it conflicts with a federal statute by
standing as an impediment to the execution of the goals and purposes of Con-
gress. Id at 491-92.
79. The Oil Pollution Act states:
Nothing in this Act... shall -
(1) affect, or be construed or interpreted as preempting, the authority
of any state or political subdivision thereof from imposing any addi-
tional liability or requirements with respect to -
(A) the discharge of oil or other pollution by oil within such a
State; or
(B) any removal activity in connection with such a discharge.
33 U.S.C. § 2718(a)(1)(Supp. 1 1990).
80. Section 1321(o) of the Clean Water Act provides in relevant part:
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as preempting any State
or political subdivision thereof from imposing any requirement or
liability with respect to the discharge of oil or hazardous substance
into any waters within such State,or with respect to any removal
activities related to such discharge.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed.., to affect any state or
local law not in conflict with this section.
33 U.S.C. § 1321(o)(1988 & Supp. II 1990).
81. 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
82. Id at 328.
83. Id. at 329.
84. Id. at 336.
85. See In re Complaint of Allied Towing Corp., 478 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Va. 1979).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 403.
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does not preempt state common law claims that do not obstruct the
full implementation of the Clean Water Act.88 The Ouellette case in-
volved state common law claims brought by private property own-
ers.8 9 The plaintiffs filed suit in Vermont state court, under the
Vermont common law of nuisance, against operators of a paper mill
alleged to have discharged pollutants into a lake.90 The court's hold-
ing can most likely be applied to similar claims brought by the state
government.
Because the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 is based upon the Clean
Water Act,9' decisions that explicate the Clean Water Act's preemp-
tion provision can likely be extended to apply to the almost identical
provision contained in the Oil Pollution Act. The legislative history of
the Oil Pollution Act specifically refers to the Clean Water Act's pres-
ervation of more stringent state laws.92 The legislative history notes
that, at the time of its writing, twenty-four states had enacted compre-
hensive oil pollution laws. The history explicitly asserts that the Oil
Pollution Act "would permit such State laws to continue and would
not preclude enactment of new State laws."93
The existing common law and statutory scheme provide a wide va-
riety of remedies for private plaintiffs, the federal government, and
state governments. The remedies provide not only restitution for in-
jured parties, but also-in the form of harsh civil and administrative
fines-a formidable deterrent against potential carelessness on the
part of vessel and cargo owners. The criminalization of oil spill acci-
dents without a scienter requirement is therefore duplicative, wasteful
and intuitively unfair. The criminal provisions of the statutes serve
neither the purpose of necessary deterrence, nor the purpose of re-
moving from the streets dangerous elements of society. In addition,
criminal sanctions do not encourage institutional change not already
fostered through civil law provisions.
IV. OTHER LEGAL AND POLICY ARGUMENTS THAT
MILITATE AGAINST THE CRIMINALIZATION OF
ACCIDENTAL OIL SPILLS
While the existence of civil and administrative penalties that make
criminal penalties superfluous is one argument militating against the
criminalization of oil spill accidents, it is certainly not the only one.
88. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 497 (1987).
89. Id. at 484.
90. Id.
91. S. REP. No. 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 9 & 11 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
722, 730 & 732.
92. Id. at 6.
93. Id.
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Other legal and policy arguments support the proposition that envi-
ronmental accidents should not be criminalized.
The Morissette opinion 94 sought to justify the imposition of crimi-
nal penalties in certain cases of public welfare violations where no
criminal intent was shown on the ground that in such cases "penalties
commonly are relatively small, and conviction does no grave damage
to an offender's reputation."s- Although justification of strict crimi-
nal liability based on the relative leniency of the penalty does not
eliminate the constitutional and philosophical problems arising out of
the lack of a scienter requirement,96 the Morissette reasoning has set
an important precedent. That reasoning was applied by the Sixth Cir-
cuit in United States v. Wulff97 In Wulff, the defendant was charged
under the felony section of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act for offering
to sell migratory bird parts.98 In affirming the district court's dismis-
sal of all charges, the Sixth Circuit found that the felony penalty of
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act 99 -which, like its misdemeanor provi-
sions, contained no scienter requirement-violated due process. The
court reasoned that a maximum penalty of two years' imprisonment
and/or a fine of $2000 was severe and would irreparably damage one's
reputation.100 Thus, under MorissettelOl and Wulfflo2 criminal sanc-
tions should not be pursued unless intent is an element of the crime in
cases where (1) the penalty to be imposed is harsh, and (2) the defend-
ant's reputation will be significantly besmirched as a result of
prosecution.
Applying that reasoning, the criminalization of oil spill accidents
caused by large corporations is arguably unconstitutional. Although
the defendants in the Exxon Valdez case, Exxon Corporation and Ex-
94. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
95. Id at 245; See also Frances B. Sayre, Public Wefare Offenses, 33 COLUm. L. REv.
55 (1933)(arguing that criminal sanctions must require a mens rea element if the
penalty is severe, and particularly when the penalty involves imprisonment.)
96. See supra note 19.
97. 758 F.2d 1121 (6th Cir. 1985).
98. Id. at 1122.
99. 16 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1988), which formerly read as follows:
(b) Whoever, in violation of this subchapter, shall-
(2) sell, offer for sale, barter or offer to barter, any migratory bird
shall be guilty of a felony and shall be fined not more than $2,000 or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
This provision was amended on November 10, 1986, by Pub.L. 99-645, Title V
§ 501 and now requires that the defendant act "knowingly."
100. United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121, 1125 (6th Cir. 1985). The court did not
extend its ruling to the Act's misdemeanor provision on the theory that the pen-
alty and the damage to an offender's reputation if convicted of a misdemeanor is
not as great as in the case of a felony conviction.
101. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
102. 758 F.2d 1121 (6th Cir. 1985).
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xon Shipping Company, pled guilty only to misdemeanor charges, they
were assessed a combined fine of $150 million.10s Without question,
the penalty imposed on the Exxon defendants is both large and harsh.
Moreover, the notoriety gained by a corporation subject to criminal
charges can cause irreparable damage whether the indictment be for a
felony or a misdemeanor. Exxon is prominent in the public eye, and
the criminal prosecution of such a corporation is a much-publicized
event. Such publicity can have ruinous consequences for the defend-
ant's business. Under Morissette and Wulff, it is thus arguable that
the criminal prosecution of large corporations for oil spill accidents in
which scienter is absent amounts to an inappropriate compromise of
constitutional due process protections.
Additionally, the criminalization of oil spill accidents is inconsis-
tent with the legislature's treatment of other public welfare acci-
dents.104 Congress has not extended the application of criminal
sanctions to other accidents of equal or greater destructiveness. The
law, for example, provides no criminal penalty for an airline when one
of its planes crashes, killing everyone on board.105 Nor is there a crim-
inal penalty awaiting a train company when one of its trains collides
and causes extensive injury and death.
Furthermore, criminal penalties propagate waste of government
and corporate resources. Under current law, the Department of Jus-
tice prosecutes cases that are at the same time being handled through
the channels of the civil law.106 The federal government is thus re-
103. Plea agreement at 6, United States of America v. Exxon Corp., No. A90-015 CR
(D. Alaska filed Sept. 30, 1991). The Criminal Fines Improvement Act of 1987, 18
U.S.C. § 3571(c)(1988 & Supp. II 1990), vests courts with discretion to increase the
fine of organizations found guilty of a criminal offense. The Act does so by classi-
fying an offense according to the maximum term of imprisonment the law per-
mits for its violation and then increasing the fines available for each class of
offense. Thus, even a relatively small misdemeanor penalty can become quite
large if imposed upon an organization.
Of the $150 million assessed fine, $125 million was remitted and $25 million
was paid by the defendants.
104. In his comments at the Exxon defendants' sentencing hearing dated April 24,
1991, Judge H. Russell Holland stated as follows:
Congress in the sentencing guidelines has told us, the courts, that we
must do better in avoiding disparity in sentencing. I suggest that con-
gress has some work of its own to do in getting the disparity out of the
criminal laws for, as I see it, we are affording greater protection to birds
and sea otter that aren't even good for food than we are people, and I
think that's some pretty serious disparity.
Transcript of hearing at 5-6.
105. When a Northwest Airlines plane crashed in Detroit several years ago because
the pilot had failed to adjust the wings to the correct takeoff position, Northwest
Airlines was not prosecuted despite the fact that hundreds of lives were lost and
that only one four-year-old girl survived the tragedy.
106. See, e.g. Clean Water Act 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. II 1990), which
provides for both civil remedies and criminal prosecution.
1046
PUNISHMENT FOR OIL SPILLS
quired to divert monetary and human resources away from other
criminal matters such as drug prosecution and the savings and loans
crisis. The prosecuted corporation is likewise forced to expend on
criminal defense millions of dollars that would better be spent on
cleanup and restoration measures. In light of astronomical defense
costs, the corporation may be reluctant to engage in as much voluntary
cleanup and restoration as it would otherwise. In the Exxon Valdez
case,1 07 both Exxon and the government spent untold millions of dol-
lars over a two-year period in conjunction with the criminal case
before the case finally settled.
The decision to press criminal charges against a defendant where
administrative or civil actions would be equally appropriate may often
be politically motivated. Criminal prosecutions in environmental
cases attract publicity and appease the public, which, fortunately, has
become increasingly sensitive to environmental issues.' 08 The cynic
may thus accuse some prosecutors of pursuing criminal indictments in
cases of environmental accidents for purposes of currying favor with
the voting public and for personal career advancement.
The criminalization of oil spill accidents may actually deter the
shipping industry to the point of crippling its competitive existence.
American shipping has become a shrinking industry in recent years. 0 9
The number of active, U.S.-flagged ocean-going vessels of more than
1,000 gross tons has fallen from 1,082 in 1950 to 377 in 1991. The
number may fall below 100 by the end of the decade."i0 Those num-
bers compare with 1,400 equivalent ships flying Japanese colors in
1991.111 The total capacity of the U.S. fleet has dropped by thirty-
three percent between 1950 and 1991,112 and the number of marine
jobs in the privately owned active fleet has fallen from 42,000 in 1970
to 10,000 in 1991."3 The fear of criminal prosecution for accidental oil
discharges and the daunting precedent set by the Exxon Valdez case" 4
107. United States of America v. Exxon Corp., No. A90-015 CR (D. Ala. filed Feb. 27,
1990).
108. Fromm, supra note 22, at 823.
109. Ken Miller, Concern Grows Over U.S. Free Fall as Maritime Power, Gannett
News Service, September 26,1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
110. Id
111. Id-
112. Lee Smith, Lessons From the Rush to the GuU, FORTUNE, January 28, 1991, at 86.
113. Three Maritime Unions Issue Joint Statement Call for All-Out Cooperative Ef-
fort to Revitalize U.S. Fleet, PRNewswire, Sept. 9, 1991, available in Westlaw,
PRNews database. The article also quotes the heads of three major maritime
unions as asserting the following in their joint statement:
The reality is painfully clear- America's privately owned merchant fleet
continues its dangerous slide, a victim of national neglect and apathy,
with even the industry itself seemingly unmoved by the potential
consequences.
114. United States of America v. Exxon Corp., No. A90-015 CR (D. Ala. filed Feb. 27,
1990).
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may constitute an added shackle to an already seriously ailing
industry.
V. CONCLUSION
The criminalization of oil spill accidents constitutes a departure
from the traditional functions of criminal sanctions due to the lack of
a scienter element in such cases. Existing civil law provides adequate
deterrence, retribution and compensatory measures. Criminal prose-
cution in unintentional oil spill cases is thus unnecessary, wasteful,
and ultimately may even have deleterious rather than positive effects
on American industry and commerce.
